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Abstract
This paper introduces an objective for optimizing proper scoring rules. The objective is to maximize
the increase in payoff of a forecaster who exerts a binary level of effort to refine a posterior belief from
a prior belief. In this framework we characterize optimal scoring rules in simple settings, give efficient
algorithms for computing optimal scoring rules in complex settings, and identify simple scoring rules that
are approximately optimal. In comparison, standard scoring rules in theory and practice – for example
the quadratic rule, scoring rules for the expectation, and scoring rules for multiple tasks that are averages
of single-task scoring rules – can be very far from optimal.
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1 Introduction
This paper provides a framework for a principal to optimize over proper scoring rules. Proper scoring rules
are mechanisms that incentivize a forecaster to reveal her true beliefs about a probabilistic state. Proper
scoring rules are well studied in theory and widely used in practice. The optimization framework of the
paper is relevant for applications that include peer grading, peer prediction, and exam scoring.
Proper scoring rules incentivize a forecaster to reveal her true belief about an unknown and probabilistic
state. The principal publishes a scoring rule that maps the reported belief and the realized state to a reward
for the forecaster. The forecaster reports her belief about the state. The state is realized and the principal
rewards the forecaster according to the scoring rule. A scoring rule is proper if the forecaster’s optimal
strategy, under any belief she may possess, is to report that belief. Proper scoring rules are also designed
for directly eliciting a statistic of the distribution such as its expectation.
Not all proper scoring rules work well in any a given scenario. Consider the example of the quadratic
scoring rule and the application of peer grading where the score is one minus the squared difference between
the peer’s reported grade and the ground truth grade (which may be provided by the instructor). Suppose
the grades in the class are almost always between 0.6 and 1.0 (the maximum), then the peer could, without
looking review task, report 0.8 to obtain a score of at least 0.96. With the best possible score being 1.0,
the quadratic scoring rule is not well suited to deterring this effortless strategy. For this scenario, a scoring
rule is needed that gives the peer a greater incentive to exert effort in forming a belief that is specific to
the review task. More generally, to pick a good scoring rule for a given scenario, a framework is needed for
evaluating and optimizing over scoring rules.
This paper considers a mathematical program for optimization of scoring rules where (a) the objective
captures the incentive for the forecaster to exert effort and (b) the boundedness constraints prevent the
principal from scaling the scores arbitrarily. For (a), we focus on a simple binary model of effort where
the forecaster does or does not exert effort and with this effort the forecaster obtains a refined posterior
distribution from the prior distribution on the unknown state (e.g., by obtaining a signal that is correlated
with the state). We adopt the objective that takes the perspective of the forecaster at the point of the
decision with knowledge of both the prior and the distributions of posteriors that is obtained by exerting
effort. We want a scoring rule that maximizes the difference in expected scores for the posterior distribution
and prior distribution. For (b), we impose the ex post constraint that the score is in a bounded range, i.e.,
without loss, between zero and one. Notice that this program would be meaningless without a constraint
on the scores — otherwise the score could be scaled arbitrarily — and it would be meaningless without
considering the difference in scores between posterior and prior — otherwise any bounded scoring rule scaled
towards zero plus a constant close to the upper bound would be near optimal.
The first step in pursuing the optimization of scoring rules (according to the program of the previous
paragraph) is characterizing the incentive constraint of the forecaster, i.e., that the forecaster’s optimal
strategy in either the effort or no-effort case is to report her true belief. McCarthy (1956) characterizes
proper scoring rules as ones that induce a convex utility function for the forecaster, as a function of her
belief, where the scoring rule can be expressed in terms of this utility function and its pseudo-gradients. This
characterization is similar to the incentive compatible characterization of Rochet (1985) for multi-dimensional
mechanism design which has enabled the design of revenue optimal mechanisms (e.g., Daskalakis et al., 2017).
Our optimization framework, with this characterization, enables the study of optimal scoring rules under
many paradigms that have proven to be important for mechanism design.
There are several potentially important paradigms for optimization of proper scoring rules (cf. the
paradigms for mechanism design). With a family of Bayesian environments for optimizing scoring rules:
Characterization. Characterize the optimal scoring rule for any environment in the family (cf. Myerson,
1981).
Computation. Give a polynomial time algorithm for identifying and executing the optimal scoring rule for
any given environment in the family (cf. Cai et al., 2012a,b; Alaei et al., 2019).
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Simple Approximation. For any environment in the family, identify a simple scoring rule that approxi-
mates the optimal scoring rule (cf. Hartline and Roughgarden, 2009).
Prior-independent Optimization. Give a single proper scoring rule that approximates the optimal scor-
ing rule for any environment in the family (cf. Dhangwatnotai et al., 2015).
Sample Complexity. As a function of the desired precision, bound the number of samples needed for
the principal to identify a scoring rule with objective value that is within the desired precision of the
optimal scoring rule (cf. Cole and Roughgarden, 2014).
This paper focuses primarily on providing characterizations of optimal scoring rules, computing optimal
scoring rules, and identifying simple approximately optimal scoring rules. In addition, a first result on
prior-independence is given.
Results. We show that the problem of optimizing scoring rules for general beliefs over a finite set of states
reduces to the problem of optimizing scoring rules for reporting the expectation of a multi-dimensional state.
In scoring rules for the expectation of a multi-dimensional state, the forecaster is simultaneously reporting
the marginal expectations of the state in all dimensions.
We solve for the optimal scoring rule for reporting the expectation in single-dimensional space. In terms
of the utility function that characterizes the proper scoring rules, the optimal scoring rule is V-shaped with
the lower tip at the expectation of the prior belief.
For multi-dimensional forecasting when the distribution over posterior means and the state space are
given explicitly, we provide a polynomial time algorithm that computes the optimal scoring rule. For
multi-dimensional forecasting with symmetric distributions, we give an analytical characterization of the
optimal scoring rule as inducing a V-shaped utility function. For multi-dimensional forecasting without a
symmetry assumption, we identify a V-shaped scoring rule that gives a 8-approximation. This scoring rule
can be interpreted as scoring the dimension for which the agent’s posterior in the optimal single-dimensional
scoring rule gives the highest utility. Equivalently, it can be implemented by letting the agent select which
dimension to score and only scoring that dimension (after exerting effort to learn the posterior mean of all
dimensions).
Optimal scoring rules can be compared to scoring rules common in theory and practice. For predicting
a state that is supported on a finite set of [0, 1] there are two standard approaches for [0, 1] bounded scoring
rules:
• use a scoring rule for the expectation, e.g., quadratic, with payoff 1− (r− θ)2 for report r and realized
state θ;
• use a scoring rule for the distribution over a finite set of n realizable states, e.g., quadratic (a.k.a.
Brier), with payoff 1 − (1/n)
∑
i(ri − θi)
2 for reported probabilities {ri}
n
i=1 and indicators for the
realized state {θi}
n
i=1.
In environments where the optimal rule for reporting the expectation has objective value c (which is always
in [0, 1/2]), the quadratic rule for the expectation has worst-case objective value c2. Thus, as the optimal
objective value becomes small the worst-case of the quadratic rule becomes an arbitrarily bad approximation.
For scoring rules for the distribution, scoring rules like the quadratic which are averages of scoring rules for
each state in the support can be a linear factor from the optimal scoring rule. (The same linear approximation
bound holds for multi-dimensional scoring rules and the comparison of the average of single-dimensional
scoring rules to the optimal multi-dimensional scoring rule.) Moreover, the gap between the optimal scoring
rule for the expectation and the optimal scoring rule for the distribution can be unbounded even for finite
states.
We also demonstrate a first result for prior-independent analysis of scoring rules. Among scoring rules
for reporting the expectation, the quadratic scoring rule is within a constant factor of optimal. Specifically,
when the optimal scoring rule for the expectation has objective value c in [0, 1/2], the quadratic rule for the
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expectation (which does not depend on the prior) has objective value c2, and all other prior-independent
scoring rules have worst-case objective value O(c2).
An extensive discussion of future directions is given in Section 6.
Related Work. Characterizations of scoring rules for eliciting the mean and for eliciting a finite-state dis-
tribution play a prominent role in our analysis. Previous works show, in various contexts, that scoring rules
are proper if and only if their induced utility functions are convex. McCarthy (1956) characterized proper
scoring rules for eliciting the full distribution on a finite set of states. Osband and Reichelstein (1985) char-
acterized continuously differentiable scoring rules that elicit multiple statistics of a probability distribution.
Lambert (2011) characterized the statistics that admit proper scoring rules and characterized the uniformly-
Lipschitz-continuous scoring rules for the mean of a single-dimensional state. Abernethy and Frongillo (2012)
characterized the proper scoring rules for the marginal means of multi-dimensional random states in the in-
terior of the report space. We augment this characterization by showing that the induced utility function
converges to a limit on the boundary of the report space. This augmentation enables us to write the math-
ematical program that optimizes over the whole report space.
Most of the prior work looking at incentives of eliciting information considers a fundamentally different
model from ours. This prior work typically focuses on the incentives of the forecaster to exert effort to obtain
a signal (a.k.a., a data point), but then assumes that this data point is reported directly (and cannot itself
be misreported). In this space, Cai et al. (2015) considers the learning problem where the principal aims
to acquire data to train a classifier to minimize squared error less the cost of eliciting the data points from
individual agents. The mechanism for soliciting the data from the agents trades off cost (in incentivizing
effort) for accuracy of each individual point. Chen et al. (2018) and Chen and Zheng (2019) consider the
estimation of the mean of a population data. Their objective is to minimize the variance of the resulting
estimator subject to a budget constraint on the cost of procuring the data (from incentivizing effort).
The early work of Osband (1989) is closer to ours in that it assumes that the agent has a prior and, with
a continuous level effort, can receive a signal from which the prior is updated to a posterior. The principal
then aims at optimizing a quadratic loss function while incentivizing the agent to both put in effort and
truthfully report the posterior. Osband (1989) imposes some constraints on the scoring rule that restrict
it to be quadradic. In our setting of binary effort and without these constraints, we find that the optimal
scoring rule for incentivizing effort is not a quadratic scoring rule.
Contemporaneously with and independently from our work, Neyman et al. (2020) consider the optimiza-
tion of scoring rules for a binary state and a forecaster with a uniform prior and access to costly samples.
They show that scoring rules can be ranked according to the number of samples that the forecaster will
acquire, i.e., how accurate a forecast that the scoring rule will elicit, and they give a closed form solution
for the scoring rule that minimizes the expected error of the forecast in the limit as the cost of the fore-
caster’s samples goes to zero. There are four key differences between their model and ours, ordered from
restrictions to extensions: they restrict to a binary state, they restrict to a uniform prior, their boundedness
constraint is on ex ante scores not ex post scores, and they extend to integer valued effort levels. Like our
result for single-dimensional scoring rules for the mean, they give a closed form characterization. It would
be interesting to consider simple approximation and prior-independent optimization in their model.
With broad strokes, our work connects the studies of optimal mechanisms and optimimal scoring rules.
A few points of connection are especially pertinent. Characterizions of incentives in scoring rules and multi-
dimensional mechanisms are similar. The multi-dimensional characterization for mechanism design is given
by Rochet (1985). One of our main results shows that a good scoring rule for a multi-dimensional state
is the max-over-separate scoring rule, while averaging over separate scoring rules is far from optimal. This
result parallels the main contribution of Jackson and Sonnenschein (2007), that linking independent decisions
improves incentives in mechanism design. This result also connects simple scoring rules to simple mechanisms
like the bundling-or-selling-separately mechanism of Babaioff et al. (2014). Finally, the polynomial time
algorithms we give for computing optimal scoring rules (in the cases where we do not provide simple analyticic
charcterizations) are based on Briest et al. (2015).
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Organization. Section 2 formally defines the program for optimizing proper scoring rules. This program is
simplified by appropriate characterizations of proper scoring rules which are adapted from the prior literature.
Section 3 considers scoring rules for eliciting the posterior mean of a single-dimensional random state. It
characterizes the optimal scoring rule for any distribution over posteriors, it shows that the quadratic scoring
rule can be an arbitrarily bad approximation to the optimal scoring rule, but it shows that, nonetheless, the
quadratic scoring rule is within a constant factor of the optimal prior-independent scoring rule. Section 4
considers scoring rules for eliciting the marginal poster means of a multi-dimensional random state. It gives
a polynomial time algorithm for computing the optimal rule, it characterizes the optimal rule when the
distribution of posterior means is symmetric, it gives a simple scoring rule that is approximately optimal
without symmetry, and it shows that the average of separate scoring rules for each dimension can be a linear
approximation in worst case. Section 5 considers scoring rules for eliciting the full distribution over a finite
state space. It shows that there is a polynomial time algorithm for computing the optimal scoring rule and it
shows that scoring rules that elicit the mean can be arbitrarily far from optimal. Finally, Section 6 overviews
a number directions for future research that may be promising.
2 Preliminaries
In this section, we present a formal program for the optimization of proper scoring rules for multi-dimensional
random states. Section 2.1 describes the basic setting for scoring rules and provides an informal description of
the optimization problem for scoring rules that elicit the marginal means of the distribution. In Section 2.3,
we discuss the characterization of proper scoring rules for eliciting the mean with a weak regularity condition.
Section 2.2 gives the formal program for optimizing scoring rules for the mean.
A reason for our focus on scoring rules for eliciting the mean is that, even for continuous state spaces,
the communication requirements of eliciting the mean are reasonable. Moreover, as we show in Section 2.4,
the problems of optimizing scoring rules for eliciting the full distribution reduce to problems of optimizing
scoring rules for the mean.
2.1 The Scoring Rule Optimization Problem
This paper considers the problem of optimizing scoring rules. A scoring rule maps an agent’s reported belief
about a random state and the realized state to a payoff for the agent. Our model allows the agent to refine
her prior belief by exerting a binary effort. Our objective is to maximize the agent’s perceived benefit from
exerting effort, i.e., the expected difference in score from reporting the prior and posterior distributions.
There is a prior distribution D ∈ ∆(Θ) over the true state θ ∈ Θ where Θ ⊆ Rn is any n dimensional
space. The distribution D is public information for both the agent and the principal, and in addition, the
agent may privately observe a signal about the true state, which induces a posterior G. We denote the
probability the agent will obtain the posterior G by f(G). We focus on scoring rules that elicit the mean of
the posterior, i.e., the scoring rule asks the agent to report the marginal means of her posterior, and scores
the agent based on her report and the realized state. Let µG be the mean of posterior G and µD be the mean
of the prior distribution D. Let R ⊆ Rn be the report space including all possible posterior means µG and
let r ∈ R be the report of the agent. A simple property of means, the report space is the convex hull of the
state space. Two constraints on the scoring rules are the boundedness constraint and the proper constraint.
Definition 2.1. A scoring rule S(r, θ) is proper for eliciting mean if for any distribution G and report r ∈ R,
we have
Eθ∼G [S(µG, θ)] ≥ Eθ∼G [S(r, θ)] .
Definition 2.2. A scoring rule S(r, θ) is bounded by B in space R × Θ if S(r, θ) ∈ [0, B] for any report
r ∈ R and state θ ∈ Θ.
The goal for the principal is to design a bounded proper scoring rule that maximizes the difference in
expected score between agents who exert effort and those who do not. Next, we will informally define the
optimization program.
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Informal program. The problem of maximizing the difference in expected score given the maximum score
of B, the state space Θ, the report space which is the convex hull of the state space, i.e., R = conv(Θ), and
the distribution over posteriors f can be written as the following optimization program:
max
S
EG∼f,θ∼G [S(µG, θ)− S(µD, θ)] (1)
s.t. S is a proper scoring rule for eliciting the mean,
S is bounded by B in space R×Θ.
The above program aims to optimize the incentive for the agent to exert effort. Consider the situation
where the agent has a private stochastic cost for obtaining a signal of the true state. If the agent chooses
to pay the cost, she sees the realized signal, forms a posterior about the true state, and optimizes according
to the posterior. The agent will only choose to pay the cost if her expected gain from obtaining the signal,
i.e., the objective value in Program (1), is higher than her cost. By designing the optimal scoring rule for
Program (1), we also maximize the probability that the agent chooses to pay the cost. This paper will not
formally model such costs.
2.2 Eliciting the Mean with Canonical Scoring Rules
There is a canonical approach for constructing proper scoring rules. In this section we specify Program (1)
to canonical proper scoring rules. In the next section we show that this specification is without loss for the
program. The following definition and proposition are straightforward from first-order conditions and can
be found, e.g., in Abernethy and Frongillo (2012). We give the proof below because it is illustrative of the
geometry of scoring rules for eliciting the mean.
Definition 2.3. A canonical scoring rule for the mean S is defined by convex utility function u : R→ R on
report space R, subgradient ξ : R→ Rn of u, and function κ : Θ→ R on state space Θ as
S(r, θ) = u(r) + ξ(r) · (θ − r) + κ(θ). (2)
Proposition 2.4. Canonical scoring rules are proper.
Proof. Canonical scoring rules have the following simple interpretation. By making a report r, the agent
selects the supporting hyperplane of u at r on which to evaluate the state. This supporting hyperplane has
gradient ξ(r) and contains point (r, u(r)). The agent’s utility is equal to the value of the realized state θ
on this hyperplane (plus constant κ(θ) which is independent of the agent’s report). With utility given by a
random point on a hyperplane, the expected utility is equal to its mean on the hyperplane. When the agent’s
true posterior belief is that the state has mean r, the agent’s expected utility is u(r) (plus a constant equal to
the expected value of κ(·) under the agent’s posterior belief; summarized below as Lemma 2.5). Misreporting
r′ with belief r gives a utility equal to the value of r on the supporting hyperplane with gradient ξ(r′) at r′.
By convexity of u, a report of r gives the higher utility of u(r).
The following two lemmas allow the objective and the boundedness constraint of Program (1) to be
simplified. The first lemma justifies referring to u as the agent’s utility function and its proof was observed
in the proof of Proposition 2.4.
Lemma 2.5. For any canonical scoring rule for the mean S (defined by u, ξ, and κ), the expected utility
from belief G and truthfully report of µG is
Eθ∼G [S(µG, θ)] = u(µG) +Eθ∼G [κ(θ)] . (3)
Lemma 2.6. Fixing utility function u and subgradients ξ and setting the state-function κ to minimize the
score bound B, the canonical scoring rule S (defined by u, ξ and κ) satisfies
u(θ)− u(r)− ξ(r) · (θ − r) ≤ B (4)
for any report r ∈ R and state θ ∈ Θ.
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Proof. Similar to the proof of Proposition 2.4, canonical scoring rules (Definition 2.3) can be interpreted via
supporting hyperplanes of the utility function. The first term on the left-hand side of (4) upper bounds the
utility that an agent can obtain at state θ, specifically, it is the utility from reporting state θ. The remainder
of the left-hand side subtracts the utility that the agent obtains from report r in state θ, i.e., it evaluates, at
state θ, the supporting hyperplane of u at report r. Thus, the boundedness constraint requires the difference
between the utility function and the value of any supporting hyperplane of the utility function to be bounded
at all states θ ∈ Θ. Figure 1(a) illustrates this bound.
The subgradient in {ξ(r) : r ∈ R} that maximizes the right-hand side of the inequality identifies the
range of ex post score of the agent for this scoring rule. To enforce that the score is within [0, B], we select
κ(θ) equal to the negative of the lower endpoint of this range so that the score is 0 for the report with the
worst score at state θ.
Of course, since the score bound is B, this inequality is tight for some r ∈ R and θ ∈ Θ.
We now derive the simplified program for canonical scoring rules. The following notation is sufficient to
describe this simplified program and is adopted throughtout the paper. For proper scoring rules for eliciting
the mean, the posterior mean and report are denoted by r in report space R. The distribution over posterior
beliefs induces a distribution over posterior means, slightly abusing notation, we denote both distributions
by f . Specifically, f(r) =
∫
G:µG=r
f(G) dG, i.e., the density at posterior mean r is equal to the cumulative
density of posteriors G with mean µG = r. The prior mean of the distribution µD is equal to the mean of
the posterior means, denoted µf , i.e., µD = Eθ∼D [θ] = Er∼f [r] = µf .
By Lemma 2.5, the objective function in Program (1) for canonical scoring rules can be simplified as
EG∼f,θ∼G [S(µG, θ)− S(µD, θ)] =
∫
∆(Θ)
[u(µG)− u(µD)] f(G) dG =
∫
R
[u(r)− u(µf )] f(r) dr.
Note that the simplified objective function does not depend on subgradient ξ or state function κ, the latter
of which is cancelled in the score difference. Thus, the value of the objective function is uniquely determined
by the utility function u and the distribution over posterior means f . We denote the performance of utility
function u given the distribution over posteriors f by
Obj(u, f) =
∫
R
u(r) f(r) dr − u(µf ). (5)
Combining Lemma 2.6 with the simplified objective function (5), and normalizing the program such that
u(µf ) = 0, we get the following optimization program for optimizing over canonical scoring rules. In the
next section we show that the restriction to canonical scoring rules is without loss.
OPT(f,B,Θ) = max
u
∫
R
u(r)f(r) dr (6)
s.t. u is a continuous and convex function, and u(µf ) = 0,
ξ(r) ∈ ∇u(r), ∀r ∈ R,
u(θ)− u(r)− ξ(r) · (θ − r) ≤ B, ∀r ∈ R, θ ∈ Θ,
R = conv(Θ).
Note that for any distribution f and state space Θ, the optimal objective OPT(f,B,Θ) is a linear function
of the maximum score B. In most of the paper, we normalize B = 1 and mainly consider the state space
Θ = [0, 1]n. To simplify the notation, we let OPT(f) = OPT(f, 1, [0, 1]n). We will write OPT(f,B,Θ)
explicitly in Section 4 when we discuss general state spaces with bound B 6= 1.
2.3 Sufficiency of Canonical Scoring Rules
This section provides a partial converse to Proposition 2.4 and shows that the restriction to canonical scoring
rules is without loss, i.e., Program (1) and Program (6) are equivalent. The converse will require a weak
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technical restriction on the set of scoring rules considered.1 With this restriction, Abernethy and Frongillo
(2012) provide a converse to Proposition 2.4 for reports in the relative interior of the report space. In the
subsequent discussion, the boundary of the report space is denoted by ∂R and the interior of the report
space by relint(R) = R \ ∂R.
Definition 2.7 (Abernethy and Frongillo, 2012). A scoring rule S is µ-differentiable if all directional deriva-
tives of Eθ∼G [S(µG, θ)] exists for all posteriors G with mean µG in the relative interior of R.
Lemma 2.8 (Abernethy and Frongillo, 2012). Any proper and µ-differentiable scoring rule for eliciting the
mean S conincides with a canonical scoring rule (defined by u, ξ, and κ) at reports in the relative interior
of the report space, i.e., it satisfies equation (2) for all r ∈ relint(R).
The main new results need to show that canonical scoring rules are without loss for Program (1) are
extensions of Lemma 2.8 to the boundary of the report space ∂R. The form of scoring rules considered
enters the program in two places: the objective and the boundedness constraint. The two lemmas below
show that canonical scoring rules are without loss in these two places in the program. Both lemmas are
proved in Appendix A.
Lemma 2.9. Any µ-differentiable, bounded, and proper scoring rule S for eliciting the mean is equal in
expectation of truthful reports to a canonical scoring rule (defined by u, ξ, and κ), i.e., it satisfies equation (3).
Lemma 2.10. For any µ-differentiable and proper scoring rule S for eliciting the mean that induces utility
function u (via Lemma 2.9) and satisfies score bounded in [0, B], there is a canonical scoring rule defined by
u (and some ξ and κ) that satisfies the same score bound, i.e., it satisfies equation (4).
Note that Lemma 2.9 implies that the utility function u corresponding to any µ-differentiable scoring rule
S can be identified (via the equivalent cannonical scoring rule); thus, the assumption of Lemma 2.10 is well
defined. Lemma 2.9 and Lemma 2.10 combine to imply that Program (1) and Program (6) are equivalent.
Theorem 2.11. For optimization of the incentive for exerting a binary effort via a bounded and µ-differentiable
scoring rule for the mean, it is without loss to consider canonical scoring rules, i.e., Program (1) and
Program (6) are equivalent.
2.4 Proper Scoring Rules for Optimally Eliciting the Full Distribution
The previous discussions in this section focused on scoring rules for eliciting the mean of the posterior
distribution. Note that elicitation of the mean is a restriction on scoring rules and in general, the principal
could solicit the full distribution and reward the agent accordingly. In this section, we will show that, with
respect to optimization and approximation, the problems of elicitating the full posterior distribution over a
finite state space reduces to problems of eliciting the mean of a multi-dimensional state space.
Note that the sum of probabilities for all states is 1. So the report space is a |Θ|-dimensional simplex,
i.e., R = {r ∈ [0, 1]|Θ| :
∑
i ri = 1}. For simplicity, for any posterior distribution G, we also use G to
denote the |Θ|-dimensional vector of probabilities for the posterior distribution. For any finite state space
Θ = {θ(j)}
|Θ|
j=1, we rewrite state θ
(j) as |Θ|-dimensional vectors, i.e., θ
(j)
i = 1 if i = j and θ
(j)
i = 0 otherwise.
It is easy to verify that R = conv(Θ). Next we introduce the characterization of proper scoring rules for
eliciting the full distribution.
Definition 2.12. A scoring rule S is proper for eliciting the full distribution in space Θ if for any distribu-
tion G ∈ ∆(Θ) and any report G′ ∈ R, we have
Eθ∼G [S(G, θ)] ≥ Eθ∼G [S(G
′, θ)] .
1The literature on scoring rules for eliciting the mean, to the best of our knowledge, obtains converses to Proposition 2.4
only with restrictions. For example, Lambert (2011) assumes the scoring rules are continuously differentiable in the agent’s
report. The restriction we employ is weaker than differentiability.
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Theorem 2.13 (McCarthy, 1956). For any finite state space Θ and corresponding report space R, a scoring
rule S is proper for eliciting the full distribution in space Θ if and only if there exists a convex function
u : R→ R such that for any report G ∈ R and any state θ ∈ Θ, we have
S(G, θ) = u(G) + ξ(G) · (θ −G),
where ξ(G) ∈ ∇u(G) is a subgradient of u.
Similar to Lemma 2.9, if the scoring rule is bounded, then the utility function u in Theorem 2.13 is
bounded and continuous. The proof of continuity is the same as Lemma 2.9 and hence omitted here.
Note that there is no function κ(θ) in the characterization of Theorem 2.13. The reason is that here
for any finite state space Θ, any scoring rule S(G, θ) = u(G) + ξ(G) · (θ − G) + κ(θ), there exists another
convex function uˆ such that S(G, θ) = uˆ(G) + ξ(G) · (θ − G), where ξ(G) ∈ ∇uˆ(G) is a subgradient of uˆ.
The objective value for reporting the full distribution with distribution f and scoring rule S is
Obj(u, f) = EG∼f,θ∼G [S(G, θ)− S(D, θ)] =
∫
R
[u(G)− u(D)] f(G) dG
Thus the form of the objective function for reporting the full distribution coincides with the objective
function for reporting the mean. Moreover, it is easy to verify that the bounded constraint coincides as
well. This result follows because distributions with finite state space Θ can be viewed as |Θ|-dimensional
perfectly negatively correlated distributions with Bernoulli marginals. One important property of Bernoulli
distributions is that reporting the full distribution is equivalent to reporting the mean of the distribution.
Since reporting the full distribution and reporting the mean have the same characterization in this case, by
viewing the distribution as |Θ|-dimensional correlated distribution, we have the following theorem.
Theorem 2.14. For any finite state space Θ, report space R = conv(Θ), and any distribution f ∈ R over
posteriors, scoring rule S is optimal for eliciting the full distribution if and only if it is optimal for eliciting
the mean.
3 Eliciting a Single-dimensional Mean
In this section, we focus on the special case of single dimensional state spaces. We characterize the optimal
single dimensional scoring rules for eliciting the mean and show that the optimal scoring rules are simple
and only depend on the prior mean of the distribution. We compare the quadratic scoring rule to the
optimal scoring rule and show that the quadratic scoring rule, though it can be far from optimal for specific
distributions over posteriors, it is approximately optimal in the prior-independent setting.
In this section we normalize the state space Θ so that its convex hull, i.e., the report space R, is [0, 1]
and the boundedness constraint is given by B = 1.
3.1 Characterization of Optimal Scoring Rules
In this part, we characterize the optimal proper scoring rules for a single dimensional state. First note that
for single dimensional scoring rules, the boundedness constraint of Program (6) can be further simplified.
Lemma 3.1. For state space Θ with convex hull [0, 1] and any utility function u, there exists a µ-differentiable
proper scoring rule induced by function u which is bounded by B = 1 if and only if there exists a set of
subgradients ξ(r) ∈ ∇u(r) such that
u(1)− u(0)− ξ(0) ≤ 1 and u(0)− u(1) + ξ(1) ≤ 1.
Proof. By Lemma 2.10, it is sufficient to consider only convex function u such that there exists a set of
subgradients ξ(r) satisfying constraints that for any r, θ ∈ [0, 1]
u(θ)− u(r) − ξ(r) · (θ − r) ≤ 1.
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Figure 1: The figure on the left hand side illustrates the bounded constraint for proper scoring rule for
single dimensional states. The figure on the right hand side characterizes the optimal scoring rule (solid line)
for single dimensional states. In this figure, for any convex function u (dotted line) that induces a bounded
scoring rule, there exists another convex function u˜ (solid line) which also induces a bounded scoring rule
and weakly improves the objective.
By convexity of utility u and the monotonicity of subgradients ξ on report space R = [0, 1], it is straight-
forward to observe that the left-hand side of the boundedness constraint is maximized at θ ∈ {0, 1} with
r = 1− θ (see Figure 1a).
With Lemma 3.1, Program (6) can be written as
max
u
∫ 1
0
u(r)f(r) dr (7)
s.t. u(r) is convex and u(µf ) = 0,
ξ(r) ∈ ∇u(r), ∀r ∈ [0, 1],
u(1)− u(0)− ξ(0) ≤ 1,
u(0)− u(1) + ξ(1) ≤ 1.
The main result of this section is the following characterization of the optimal solutions to Program (7).
Definition 3.2. A function u is V-shaped at µ if there exists parameters a and b such that u(r) = a (r−µ)
for r ≤ µ and u(r) = b (r − µ) for r ≥ µ.
Utility functions that are V-shaped at prior mean µf are induced by scoring rules with the following
simple form. If the agent reports the prior mean her score is zero. For reports above the prior mean, the
score is equal to b (θ − µf ); and for reports below the prior mean, the score is equal to a (θ − µf ). I.e., as
discussed in Section 2.2, the agent’s report picks out the supporting hyperplane of the utility function on
which to evaluate the state.
Theorem 3.3. For any distribution f over the posterior means with expectation µf and state space Θ
with convex hull [0, 1], the optimal solutions of Program (7) are V-shaped at µf with parameters b = a +
1/max{µf , 1− µf} and objective value OPT(f) = Er∼f [max(r − µf , 0)]/max(µf , 1− µf ).
Proof. Consider any feasible solution u(r) of Program (7). We construct a V-shaped utility function u˜(r) as
u˜(r) =
{
−u(0)
µf
(r − µf ) for r ≤ µf ,
u(1)
1−µf
(r − µf ) for r ≥ µf .
The construction of u˜ is illustrated in Figure 1b. It is easy to see that u˜ is convex, u˜(µf ) = 0 and u˜(r) ≥ u(r)
for any r ∈ [0, 1]. Therefore, the objective value for function u˜ is higher than objective value for function u.
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Moreover, we have u˜(0) = u(0), u˜(1) = u(1), u˜′(0) ≥ ξ(0) and u˜′(1) ≤ ξ(1), which implies u˜ is also a feasible
solution to Program (7). Thus, an optimal solution is V-shaped.
Next we focus on finding the optimal V-shaped function u˜ for Program (7). Let a = −u(0)/µf = u˜′(0)
and b = u(1)/(1− µf ) = u˜′(1). Since function u˜ satisfies the constraints in Program (7), we get
b(1− µf ) = u˜(1) ≤ 1 + u˜(0) + u˜
′(0) = 1− a · µf + a,
b(1− µf ) = u˜(1) ≥ u˜
′(1) + u˜(0)− 1 = b− a · µf − 1,
which implies b ≤ a + 1/(1− µf ) and b ≤ a + 1/µf . If b < a + 1/max{µf , 1− µf}, then we can either increase b
or decrease a to get a better feasible V-shaped utility function. Suppose we fix parameter a, the objective
value is pointwise maximized for any report r when b = a+ 1/max{µf , 1− µf}.
Next we fix the optimal choice for parameter b. Note that the objective value given any parameter a is∫ 1
0
u(r)f(r) dr =
∫ µf
0
a(r − µf )f(r) dr +
∫ 1
µf
(
a+
1
max(µf , 1− µf )
)
(r − µf )f(r) dr
=
1
max(µf , 1− µf )
∫ 1
µf
(r − µf )f(r) dr, (8)
which invariant of parameter a. Therefore, any V-shaped utility function with parameters satisfying b =
a+ 1/max{µf , 1− µf} is optimal and obtains objective value given by equation (8).
As mentioned above, we see from Theorem 3.3 that the set of utility functions that optimizes Program (7)
only depends on the prior mean µf and not the general shape of the distribution over posterior means f .
An important special case for our subsequent analyses is when the mean of the posteriors is in the center
of the report space, i.e., µf = 1/2 for report space [0, 1]. In this case, an optimal utility function u is V-
shaped at 1/2 with u(0) = u(1) = 1/2. In fact, the symmetric case where f is the uniform distribution on the
extremal poster means {0, 1} obtains the highest objective value for Program (7) with OPT(f) = 1/2. These
two observations are fomalized in the following two corollaries.
Corollary 3.4. For any distribution f over the posterior means with expectation µf = 1/2, one of the optimal
solution of Program (7) is symmetric and V-shaped at 1/2 with u(0) = u(1) = 1/2.
Corollary 3.5. The objective value of any utility function u that is feasible for Program (7) on distribution
f of posterior means is at most 1/2, i.e., Obj(u, f) ≤ 1/2.
Proof. In the characterization of the optimal performance of Theorem 3.3, i.e.,
OPT(f) = Er∼f [max(r − µf , 0)]/max(µf , 1− µf ),
it is easy to see that the numerator is maximized and the denominator is minimized in when the distibution
of posterior means f is uniform on the extreme points {0, 1}. For this distribution, the numerator is 1/4 and
the denominator is 1/2. Thus, OPT(f) = 1/2.
3.2 The Quadratic Scoring Rule and Prior-independent Approximation
The previous section showed that the optimal single-dimensional scoring rule depends on the distribution over
posteriors and, more specifically, on the mean of this distribution. On the other hand, standard scoring rules
in theory and practice, like the quadradic scoring rule, are prior-independent, i.e., they do not depend on the
principal’s prior distribution (over posterior distributions of the agent), cf. Dhangwatnotai et al. (2015). This
section focuses on the quadratic scoring rule. It gives the characterization in terms of utility of the quadratic
scoring rule for eliciting the mean of a single-dimensional state. It analizes the approximation factor of the
quadratic scoring rule with respect to the optimal scoring rule, and shows that the performance of the former
is quadratic in the performance of the latter. Specifically, the ratio of performances is unbounded as the
performance of the optimal scoring rule approaches zero (and such a sequence of prior distributions exists).
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Thus, we conduct the prior-independent analysis on families of priors which give the same performance of the
optimal scoring rule (cf. the “max/max ratio” of Ben-David and Borodin, 1994). Within each such family,
the quadratic rule is approximately optimal among all prior-independent scoring rules.
The following observations will be useful in our analysis of the quadratic and other prior-independent
scoring rules. First, for prior-independent analysis, the designer does not know the prior mean µf of the
distribution. Therefore, we consider Program (7) equivalently with the agent’s utility for reporting the prior
mean u(µf) subtracted from the objective and without the constraint u(µf) = 0. Second, in the worst case
it is sufficient to only consider posterior distributions that are uniformly drawn as one of two deterministic
points. This latter result is formalized in the following lemma.
Lemma 3.6. For any distribution f over posterior means, there exists another distribution f˜ over posterior
means with 2 point masses that satisfies OPT(f˜) = OPT(f) and for any convex function u, Obj(u, f˜) ≤
Obj(u, f).
Proof. For any distribution f with prior mean µf , let f˜ be the distribution that has
• a point mass at Ef [r
′|r′ < µf ] with probability Prf [r
′ < µf ];
• a point mass at Ef [r
′|r′ ≥ µf ] with probability Prf [r
′ ≥ µf ].
By Theorem 3.3, it is easy to verify that the optimal does not change, i.e., OPT(f) = OPT(f˜), and for any
convex u, by Jensen’s Inequality, we have Obj(u, f˜) ≤ Obj(u, f).
The quadratic scoring rule that is the focus of this section is defined as follows.
Definition 3.7. The [0, 1]-bounded quadratic scoring rule for eliciting the mean with state and report spaces
Θ = R = [0, 1] is Sq(r, θ) = 1− (θ − r)
2. For functions uq(r) = r
2 and κq(θ) = 1 − θ
2 the quadratic scoring
rule is Sq(r, θ) = uq(r) + u
′
q(r) · (θ − r) + κq(θ).
Lemma 3.6 enables the identification of the worst-case performance the quadratic scoring rule. Recall
that, by Corollary 3.5, the optimal objective value is at most 1/2, i.e., OPT(f) ∈ (0, 1/2].
Theorem 3.8. Let Fc be the set of distributions such that the objective value of the optimal scoring rule is
c ∈ (0, 1/2], i.e., OPT(f) = c for any f ∈ Fc. We have that for utility function uq of quadratic scoring rule,
min
f∈Fc
Obj(uq, f) = c
2.
Proof. Suppose the distribution over report f(r) has two point masses, which is a with probability p, and
b > a with probability 1−p. Then, we have the mean of prior is µf = pa+(1−p)b and a < µf < b. Without
loss of generality, we can assume that µf ≤
1
2 . By Theorem 3.3, it holds that
c = OPT(f) =
1
max{µf , 1− µf}
· (1− p)(b − µf ) =
p(1− p)(b − a)
max{µf , 1− µf}
. (9)
For quadratic scoring rule with utility function uq(r) = r
2 (Definition 3.7), we have
Obj(uq, f) = Er∼f [uq(r)] − uq(µf ) = p(a
2 − µ2f ) + (1− p)(b
2 − µ2f ) = p(1− p)(b− a)
2. (10)
Combining equations (9) and (10), we have
Obj(uq, f) = (max{µf , 1− µf})
2 ·
c2
p(1− p)
.
The worst case ratio is achieved when Obj(uq, f) is minimized, i.e., µf =
1
2 and p =
1
2 , which gives
minf∈Fc Obj(uq, f) = c
2.
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As evident from the proof of Theorem 3.8, for any c ∈ (0, 1/2] there is a non-trivial family of distri-
butions Fc for which OPT(f) = c. As the worst-case performance of the quadratic scoring rule on Fc is
minf∈Fc Obj(uq, f) = c
2, the prior-independent approximation factor of the quadratic scoring rule is un-
bounded. In fact, as we show next, this result is not a limitation of the quadratic scoring rule. For the
family of distributions Fc, any prior-independent scoring rule can at most guarantee a worst-case objective
value of O(c2). Thus, the quadratic rule is within a constant factor of the prior-independent optimal rule.
Theorem 3.9. Let Fc be the set of distributions over posterior means such that the objective value of the
optimal scoring rule is c ∈ (0, 1/2], i.e., OPT(f) = c for any f ∈ Fc. For any convex and bounded utility
function u, we have
min
f∈Fc
Obj(u, f) ≤ min(12 ,
8c2
(1−4c)2 ) ≤ 32c
2.
To simplify the proof of Theorem 3.9, we define the benchmark O˜PT as an approximate upper-bound on
OPT:
O˜PT(f) = 2max(µf , 1− µf )OPT(f) = 2Er∼f [max(r − µf , 0)] .
Notice that max(µf , 1 − µf ) ∈ [1/2, 1]; thus, OPT(µf ) ≤ O˜PT(µf ) ≤ 2OPT(µf ). Thus, approximation of
benchmark O˜PT is equivalent to approximation of OPT up to a factor of two. Theorem 3.9 is obtained from
Lemma 3.10 and the bound of c ≤ c˜ ≤ 2 c.
Lemma 3.10. Let Fc˜ be the set of distributions over posterior means such that benchmark O˜PT is c˜ ∈ (0, 1/2].
For any convex and bounded utility function u, we have
min
f∈Fc
Obj(u, f) ≤ min(12 ,
2c˜2
(1−2c˜)2 ) ≤ 8c˜
2.
Proof. A convex and bounded utility function u has monotone derivative u′ and, by Lemma 3.1, the amount
this derivative increases on its [0, 1] domain is u′(1) − u′(0) bounded by 2. Consider any positive integer d
and partition the [0, 1] domain of u into interval into d intervals of width 1/d. By the pigeon hole principle,
one part must contain at most the average increase of u′, i.e., there exists interval [a, b = a + 1/d] with
u′(b)− u′(a) ≤ 2/d.
Consider distribution fd defined as the uniform distribution over deterministic points a and b with mean
µd = a+ 1/2d. By the definition of benchmark O˜PT:
O˜PT(fd) = 2Er∼fd [max(r − µd, 0)] =
1
2d .
Calculating the objective value of utility function u, we have
Obj(u, fd) =
u(a) + u(b)
2
− u(µd) ≤
u′(b)− u′(a)
2
·
b − a
2
=
1
2d2
,
where the inequality follows from identifying an optimal utility u satisfying u′(b) − u′(a) ≤ 2/d. It is
u′(r) = − 1/d for r ∈ [a, µd) and u
′(r) = 1/d for r ∈ (µd, b]. Combining the two bounds with O˜PT(fd) = c˜ we
see that Obj(u, fd) ≤ 2 c˜
2 for c˜ ∈ {1/2d : d ∈ {1, . . .}}.
To extend this bound to all c˜ ∈ [0, 1/2], observe that the bound on Obj(u, fd) easily extends to Obj(u, fd′)
for non-integral d′ ≥ d, while the value of O˜PT(fd′) holds as calculated for non-integral d
′. Thus, we
can obtain bounds for non-integral d′ by combining bounds on O˜PT(fd+1) and Obj(u, fd). Solving for the
bound on Obj(u, fd) in terms of c˜ = O˜PT(fd+1): for any c˜ ∈ (0, 1/2] there exists f ∈ Fc˜ with Obj(u, f) ≤
min(12 ,
2c˜2
(1−2c˜)2 ) ≤ 8 c˜
2. The first inequality holds by substituting d = 1/2c˜− 1 into the formula of Obj(u, fd),
the second inequality uses Obj(u, f) ≤ 1/2 and notes that the bound of the first inequality is trivial until
c˜ ≤ 1/4, and thereafter the denominator is lower bounded by 1/4.
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Combining Theorem 3.8 with Theorem 3.9, the quadratic scoring rule approximates any prior-independent
scoring rule in terms of worst case payoff.
Theorem 3.11. For any constant c ∈ (0, 1/2], let Fc be the set of distributions such that the objective value
of the optimal scoring rule is c, i.e., OPT(f) = c for any f ∈ Fc. Let U be the set of convex and bounded
utility functions u. For quadratic utility function uq, we have
min
f∈Fc
Obj(uq, f) ≥
1
32
max
u∈U
min
f∈Fc
Obj(u, f).
Note that in Theorem 3.11, the quadratic scoring rule does not exploit the extra information that
OPT(f) = c and still achieves a constant approximation to the optimal max-min scoring rule in worst
case.
4 Elicitation of a Multi-dimensional Mean
In this section, we focus on the case when the state space is multi-dimensional. We first give a polynomial
time algorithm that identifies the optimal scoring rule for the problem when the posterior distribution and
the set of realizable states are given explicitly. Then we characterize the optimal scoring rule for symmetric
distributions over posterior means, and propose a simple scoring rule that is approximately optimal for
asymmetric distributions. Finally, we show that the standard approach in both theory and practice of scoring
the agents separately in each dimension is not a good approximation to the optimal multi-dimensional scoring
rule.
4.1 Computing the Optimal Scoring Rule
We adopt an approach from Briest et al. (2015) and show that when the state space and the support of the
posterior means are finite, there exists a polynomial time algorithm that solves the optimal scoring rule for
eliciting the marginal means of a posterior.
Theorem 4.1. Given any n-dimensional state space Θ with |Θ| = d states and any distribution f with
support size m over posterior means, there exists an algorithm that computes the optimal proper bounded
scoring rule for eliciting the mean in time polynomial in n, m, and d.
To prove this theorem, we introduce a proposition stating the equivalence of Bayesian auction design and
the design of proper scoring rules. With this equivalence result, we can solve Program (6) with finite reports
using a linear program with (n+ 1)(m+ d+ 1) variables and a quadratic number of constraints.
Proposition 4.2. A function u is the utility function of a µ-differentiable B-bounded proper scoring rule for
eliciting the mean on report space R = conv(Θ) and n-dimensional state space Θ if and only if there exists
allocation and payment functions x(·) and p(·) satisfying
1. Bayesian incentive compatible: x(r) · r − p(r) ≥ x(r′) · r − p(r′), for any report r, r′ ∈ R;
2. bounded utility difference: x(θ) · θ − p(θ) ≤ B + x(r) · θ − p(r), for any report r ∈ R and state θ ∈ Θ;
3. induced utility is u(r) = x(r) · r − p(r) for any r ∈ R.
Note that the bounded utility difference property means the utility loss for misreporting r with true state θ is
at most B.
Proof. For the “if” direction: If the allocation x and payment p satisfies the above conditions, by Rochet
(1985) and the Bayesian incentive compatibility, the utility function u is continuous and convex, and ξ(r) =
x(r) is a feasible subgradient of the utility function. By bounded utility difference, we have that
u(θ)− u(r) − ξ(r) · (θ − r) = x(θ) · θ − p(θ)− x(r) · r + p(r) − x(r) · (θ − r)
= x(θ) · θ − p(θ)− x(r) · θ + p(r) ≤ B,
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which implies utility function u corresponds to a µ-differentiable B-bounded proper scoring rule.
For the “only if” direction: Given a utility function u of a µ-differentiable bounded proper scoring rule
for eliciting the mean, by Lemma 2.10, there exists a set of subgradients ξ(r) ∈ ∂u(r) such that
u(θ)− u(r)− ξ(r) · (θ − r) ≤ B
for any report r ∈ R and state θ ∈ Θ. Setting the allocation as x(r) = ξ(r), and the payment as p(r) =
r · ξ(r) − u(r), it is easy to verify that this allocation and payment satisfy the three conditions above.
Proof of Theorem 4.1. Denote the finite set of state space as Θ = {θj}
d
j=1, Let the support of distribution f
over posterior means be {ri}
m
i=1. Denote the probability that posterior mean ri happens as fi. For simplicity,
denote r0 = µf as the mean of the prior and rm+j = θj as the report for pointmass distribution on states
for any j ∈ [d]. Program (6) is equivalent to the following program.
max
{xi,pi}i∈{0,...,m+d}
∑
i∈[m]
(xi · ri − pi) fi (11)
s.t. x0 · r0 − p0 = 0,
xi · ri − pi ≥ xi′ · ri − pi′ , ∀i, i
′ ∈ {0, . . . ,m+ d},
(xi · ri − pi)− (xi′ · ri − pi′) ≤ B ∀i ∈ {m+ 1, . . . ,m+ d}, i
′ ∈ {0, . . . ,m+ d}.
Note that Program (11) is a linear program with number of variables and constraints polynomial in n, m,
and d; and hence there exists a polynomial time algorithm that optimally solves it. Next we will formally
prove the equivalence of Program (6) and Program (11).
For one direction: For any utility function u that is a feasible solution to Program (6), by Proposition 4.2,
there exists corresponding allocation and payment functions x and p. Let the variables in Program (11) be
xi = x(ri), pi = p(ri), for any i ∈ {0, . . . ,m + d}. It is easy to verify that this is a feasible solution to
Program (11) with the same objective value.
For the other direction: For any feasible solution {xi, pi}i∈{0,...,m+d} to Program (11), define the utility
function
u(r) = max
i∈{0,...,m+d}
xi · r − pi
for any report r ∈ R. We show that this utility function u satisfies Program (6) and has the same objective
value. Obviously, the utility function u is continuous and convex. For any i ∈ {0, . . . ,m + d}, the utility
function u(ri) = xi ·ri−pi by the definition of Bayesian incentive compatibility, and hence the objective value
of Program (6) given by this utility u equals the objective value of Program (11). Moreover, for any report
r ∈ R, letting i′ = argmaxi∈{0,··· ,m+d} xir−pi, the allocation xi′ is a subgradient of the utility function u(r)
at report r. Thus, we have for any state θ(j) ∈ Θ
u(θ(j))− u(r) − ξ(r) · (θ(j) − r) = (xm+j · θ
(j) − pm+j)− (xi′ · r − pi′)− xi′ · (θ
(j) − r)
= (xm+j · θ
(j) − pm+j)− (xi′ · θ
(j) − pi′) ≤ B,
where the last inequality holds by the bounded utility difference property. Therefore, utility function u is a
feasible solution to Program (6), which establishes the equivalence of two programs.
4.2 Optimal Scoring Rules for Symmetric Distributions
This section characterizes the optimal multi-dimensional scoring rule when the distribution over posteriors
is symmetric about its center. Program (6) is optimized by a symmetric V-shaped utility function. This
characterization affords a simple interpretation for rectangular report and state spaces, specifically, the
optimal scoring rule can be calculated by taking the maximum score over optimal single-dimensional scoring
rules for each dimension, i.e., it is a max-over-separate scoring rule. We first give the characterization and
then give the interpretation.
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Definition 4.3. A n-dimensional distribution f is center symmetric if there exists a center in the report
space, i.e., C ∈ R such that for any r ∈ R, f(r) = f(2C − r).
Note that for any center symmetric distribution f over posterior means, the mean of the prior coincides
with the center of the space, i.e., µf = C. The following definition generalizes symmetric V-shaped functions
to multi-dimensional state and report spaces.
Definition 4.4. A function u is symmetric V-shaped in report and state space R = Θ with non-empty
interior and center C if utility is zero at the center, i.e., u(C) = 0, utility is 1/2 on the boundary, i.e.,
u(r) = 1/2 for r ∈ ∂R, and all other points linearly interpolate between the center and the boundary, i.e.,
u(α · r + (1 − α) · C) = α2 for any α ∈ [0, 1] and r ∈ ∂R.
V-shaped utility functions on convex and center symmetric spaces are bounded and convex, i.e., they are
feasible solutions to Program (6).
Lemma 4.5. For any convex and center symmetric report and state space R = Θ with non-empty interior,
the center symmetric utility function is convex and bounded for B = 1.
Proof. The following geometry of the utility function is easy verify. First, convexity of report space R implies
convexity of u. Second, consider the n + 1 dimensional space R × [−1/2, 1/2], where the n + 1st dimension
represents the utility u. The utility function defines a truncated convex cone with vertex equal to (µf , 0)
and base at height 1/2 with cross section R. Consider the point reflection, henceforth, the reflected cone,
of this convex cone around its vertex (µf , 0). By basic properties of cones and their point reflections, this
reflected cone has the same supporting hyperplanes as the original cone. By the symmetry assumption of R
around µf , the reflected cone is equal to the mirror reflection of the original cone with respect to the u = 0
plane. Consequently, the base of the reflected cone at u = −1/2 has cross section equal to R.
We now argue that the utility function satisfies the boundeness constraint, restated for convenience (with
report r ∈ R and state θ ∈ Θ):
u(θ)− u(r)−∇u(r) · (θ − r) ≤ 1.
By definition of the V-shaped utility, we know that the first term is at most 1/2. The second and third terms,
together, can be viewed as subtracting the evaluation, at state θ, of the supporting hyperplane of u at r.
The highest point in the reflected cone for any θ ∈ R is −u(θ) and this point lower bounds the value of θ
in any of the reflected cones supporting hyperplanes (which are the same as the original cones supporting
hyperplanes). By definition, the reflected cone satisfies −u(θ) ≥ −1/2 for θ ∈ R. We conclude, as desired,
that the difference between the first term and the second and third terms is at most 1.
The following theorem is proved by following a standard approach in multi-dimensional mechanism design,
e.g., Armstrong (1996) and Haghpanah and Hartline (2015). The problem is relaxed onto single-dimensional
paths, solved optimally on paths, and it is proven that the solution on paths combine to be a feasible solution
on the whole space. Note that in relaxing the problem onto paths, constraints on pairs of reports that are
not on the same path are ignored.
Theorem 4.6. For any center symmetric distribution f over posterior means in convex report and state
space R = Θ, the optimal solution for Program (6) is symmetric V-shaped.
Proof. Consider relaxing the optimization problem on the general space solve it independently on lines
through the center. Specifically, consider the conditional distribution of f on the line segment through the
center µf and the boundary points r and 2µf − r on ∂R. Center symmetry implys symmetry on this line
segment. By Corollary 3.4, the solution to this single-dimensional problem is symmetric V-shaped, i.e., with
u(r) = u(2µf − r) = 1/2 and u(µf ) = 1/2.
The solutions on all lines through the center µf coincide at µf with u(µf ) = 0. They can be combined,
and the resulting utility function u is a symmetric V-shaped function (Definition 4.4). Lemma 4.5 implies
that u is convex and bounded and, thus feasible for the original program. Since it optimizes a relaxation of
the original program, it is also optimal for the original program.
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In the remainder of this section we give an interpretation of scoring rules that correspond to V-shaped
utility functions on rectangular report and state spaces. On such spaces, these optimal scoring rules can be
implemented as the maximum over separate scoring rules (for each dimension). These max-over-separate
scoring rules have an indirect choose-and-report implementation where the agent reports the dimension to
be scored on and the mean for that dimension. This indirect implementation has a practical advantage that
in n-dimensional spaces, it requires only reporting two rather than n numbers.
Definition 4.7. A scoring rule S is choose-and-report if there exists single dimensional scoring rules
(Sˆ1, . . . , Sˆn) such that the agent reports dimension i and mean value ri, and receives score S((i, ri), θ) =
Sˆi(ri, θi).
An agent’s optimal strategy in the choose-and-report scoring rule for proper single-dimensional scoring
rules (Sˆ1, . . . , Sˆn) is to choose the dimension i with the highest expected score according to the posterior
distribution, i.e., i = argmaxj Eθj∼Gj
[
Sˆj(µGj , θj)
]
, and to report the mean of the posterior for that dimen-
sion, i.e., µGi . As described above, the advantage of such an indirect scoring rule is that it only requires
the agent to report two values to the principal. We first illustrate a few nice properties of choose-and-report
scoring rules.
Lemma 4.8. The choose-and-report scoring rule S defined by proper and bounded single-dimensional scoring
rules (Sˆ1, . . . , Sˆn) is itself proper and bounded.
Proof. Given posterior distribution G, let i be the dimension that maximizes the agent’s expected utility
under separate scoring rules Sˆ1, . . . , Sˆn, i.e., i = argmaxj Eθj∼Gj
[
Sˆj(µGj , θj)
]
, and let ri = µGi be the
mean of the posterior on dimension i. For report r = (i, ri) and any other report r
′ = (i′, r′i), we have
Eθ∼G [S(r, θ)] = Eθi∼Gi
[
Sˆi(ri, θi)
]
≥ Eθi′∼Gi′
[
Sˆi′(µGi′ , θi′)
]
≥ Eθi′∼Gi′
[
Sˆi′(r
′
i′ , θi′)
]
= Eθ∼G [S(r
′, θ)] .
The first and last equality hold by the definition of choose-and-report proper scoring rules, and the first
inequality holds by the definition of dimension i. The second inequality holds since each single dimensional
scoring rule is proper. Thus the choose-and-report scoring rule S is proper. Moreover, if each single dimen-
sional proper scoring rule Sˆi is bounded, it is easy to verify that the choose-and-report scoring rule S is also
bounded.
Since this section focuses on scoring rules where the agent directly reports the marginal means of the
distribution, we introduce the following max-over-separate scoring rule. It is easy to verify that any max-
over-separate scoring rule can be implemented as a choose-and-report scoring rule, and a max-over-separate
scoring rule is proper and bounded if is based on single dimensional scoring rules that are proper and
bounded.
Definition 4.9. A scoring rule S is max-over-separate if there exists single dimensional scoring rules
(Sˆ1, . . . , Sˆn) such that
1. For any dimension i, Sˆi(ri, θi) = uˆi(ri)+ ξˆi(ri) · (θi−ri)+ κˆi(θi) where ξˆi(ri) is a subgradient of convex
function uˆi(ri) and κˆi(θi) = βi is a constant.
2. the score is S(r, θ) = Sˆi(ri, θi) where i = argmaxj Sˆj(rj , rj).
The correctness of max-over-separate as implementing a choose-and-report scoring rule is based on the
equality of Sˆj(rj , rj) (from condition 2) and Eθj∼Gj [Sj(rj , θj)] for any marginal posterior distribution Gj on
dimension j with mean rj . Specifically, since the function κˆj is a constant function of the state, all posteriors
Gj with the same mean induce the same expected score.
We conclude the section by showing that, for rectangular report and state spaces, symmetric V-shaped
utility functions, which are shown to be optimal by Theorem 4.6, can be implemented by max-over-separate
scoring rules.
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0
Figure 2: This figure depicts a two-dimensional state space. The state space Θ = [0, 1]2 and its point
reflection around the prior mean µf are shaded in gray. The extended report and state space are depicted
by the region within the thick black rectangle. The convex hull of the shaded region, enclosed by a dashed
gray perimeter, is the state space Θ˜′′ in Section 4.3.2.
Lemma 4.10. Symmetric V-shaped function u in n-dimensional rectangle report and state space R = Θ =
×ni=1[ai, bi] with function κ(θ) = 1/2 can be implemented as max-over-separate scoring rule with single
dimensional bounded proper scoring rules {Sˆi}
n
i=1 where
Sˆi(ri, θi) =
{
− 1
bi−ai
(θi − µDi) +
1
2 for ri ≤ µDi ,
1
bi−ai
(θi − µDi) +
1
2 for ri ≥ µDi ,
where µDi = (ai + bi)/2 is the i
th coordinate of the prior mean µf .
Proof. First, it is easy to verify that the single dimensional scoring rules Sˆi are proper and bounded in [0, 1].
For each dimension i, the utility function for each single dimensional scoring rule Sˆi is V-shaped with
uˆi(ri) =
{
− 1
bi−a1
(ri − µDi) ri ≤ µDi
1
bi−a1
(ri − µDi) ri ≥ µDi
, and κˆi(θi) = 1/2.
By Definition 4.9, the max-over-separate scoring rule S is S(r, θ) = Sˆi(ri, θi) where i ∈ argmaxj uˆj(rj), and
hence the utility function for max-over-separate scoring rule S can be computed as u(r) = maxi∈[n] uˆi(ri),
which coincides with the symmetric V-shaped function u.
Corollary 4.11. For any center symmetric distribution f over posterior means in rectangular report and
state space R = Θ, a max-over-separate scoring rule is optimal.
4.3 Approximately Optimal Scoring Rules for General Distributions
When the distribution is not symmetric, max-over-separate scoring rules may not be optimal for Program (6).
However, we show that the optimal max-over-separate scoring rule is approximately optimal for any asym-
metric and possibly correlated distribution over a high dimensional rectangular space.
Theorem 4.12. For any distribution f over posterior means in n-dimensional rectangular report and state
space R = Θ =×ni=1[ai, bi], the utility function u of optimal max-over-separate scoring rule for Program (6)
achieves at least 1/8 of the optimal objective value, i.e. Obj(u, f) ≥ 1/8 ·OPT(f,B,Θ).
In the following discussion, we assume without loss of generality that µDi ≥ (ai + bi)/2 for every dimen-
sion i. The proof of this theorem introduces the following constructs:
• The extended report and state space are R˜ = Θ˜ =×ni=1[ai, 2µDi − ai]. These are rectangular and
contain the original report and state spaces R = Θ. See Figure 2.
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• The symmetric extended distribution of f on the extended report space is f˜(r) = 12 (f(r)+ f(2µf − r)).
Note in this definition that the original distribution f satisfies f(r) = 0 for any r ∈ R˜ \R.
Theorem 4.12 now follows by combining the following five lemmas.
Lemma 4.13. Evaluated on any distribution over posterior means f , the optimal max-over-separate scoring
rule for the distribution f and the state space Θ is at least as good as the optimal scoring rule for the extended
distribution f˜ and the extended state space Θ˜.
Lemma 4.14. The symmetric optimizer u˜ for the symmetric extended distribution f˜ and extended state
space Θ˜ attains the same objective value on the original distribution f , i.e., Obj(u˜, f) = OPT(f˜ , B, Θ˜).
Lemma 4.15. On extended state space Θ˜, the optimal value of Program (6) for the symmetric extended
distribution f˜ is at least half that for the original distribution f , i.e., OPT(f˜ , B, Θ˜) ≥ 12OPT(f,B, Θ˜).
Lemma 4.16. For any distribution over posterior means f , the optimal value of Program (6) on the extended
state space Θ˜ is at least a quarter of that of the original state space Θ, i.e., OPT(f,B, Θ˜) ≥ 14OPT(f,B,Θ)
or equivalently OPT(f, 4B, Θ˜) ≥ OPT(f,B,Θ).
4.3.1 Proofs of Lemma 4.13-Lemma 4.15
Proof of Lemma 4.13. This result follows because the extended distribution is symmetric on the extended
state space, thus, its optimal scoring rule is max-over-separate (Corollary 4.11). This scoring rule can be
applied to the original space where it is still max-over-separate. The optimal max-over-separate scoring rule
for the original space is no worse.
Proof of Lemma 4.14. Let u˜ be the optimal utility function corresponding to OPT(f˜ , B, Θ˜). Since the
distribution f˜ is center symmetric, by Theorem 4.6, the utility function u˜ is symmetric V-shaped. Thus, we
have
OPT(f˜ , B, Θ˜) =
∫
R˜
u˜(r) f˜ (r) dr
=
1
2
∫
R
u˜(r) f(r) dr +
1
2
∫
R
u˜(2µf − r) f(r) dr
=
∫
R
u˜(r) f(r) dr = Obj(u˜, f).
Proof of Lemma 4.15. Let uˆ be the optimal solution of Program (6) with distribution f and state space Θ˜,
i.e., Obj(uˆ, f) = OPT(f,B, Θ˜). On the other hand, utility function uˆ may not be optimal for distribution
f˜ , thus, OPT(f˜ , B, Θ˜) ≥ Obj(uˆ, f˜). We have,
OPT(f˜ , B, Θ˜) ≥ Obj(uˆ, f˜) =
∫
R˜
uˆ(r) f˜(r) dr =
1
2
∫
R
u˜(r) f(r) dr +
1
2
∫
R
u˜(2µf − r) f(r) dr
≥
1
2
∫
R
u˜(r) f(r) dr =
1
2
OPT(f,B, Θ˜)
where the final inequality follows from convexity of uˆ,
∫
R
(2µf − r) f(r) dr = µf , Jensen’s Inequality, and
uˆ(µf ) = 0.
4.3.2 Proof of Lemma 4.16
The approach to proving Lemma 4.16, i.e., OPT(f,B, Θ˜) ≥ 14OPT(f,B,Θ), is as follows. Let u be the
optimal utility corresponding to OPT(f,B,Θ). We construct u˜ that (a) exceeds u at all point r ∈ R and
(b) is feasible for OPT(f, 4B, Θ˜). The utility function u˜/4, thus, has objective value at least 14OPT(f,B,Θ)
and is feasible for OPT(f,B, Θ˜). The optimal utility is only better.
The proof of the lemma introduces the following constructs.
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Figure 3: The figure on the left hand side illustrates a hyperplane for report r′ on the boundary of the
report space, which is shifted from a tangent plane of u at the boundary r′. The figure on the right hand
side illustrates the extended utility function u˜ that takes the supremum over all hyperplanes shifted from
the feasible tangent planes to intersect with the (µf , 0) point.
• The extended utility function u˜ for program OPT(f, 4B, Θ˜) given utility function u for the program
OPT(f,B,Θ) is defined as follows.
Feasibility of u for Program (6) defines subgradients {ξ(r) : r ∈ R} that satisfy the boundedness
condition. Let Gu be the set of all subgradients of u that satisfy the boundedness constraint. Clearly
the latter set contains the former set. Define the extended utility function u˜ as the convex function
defined by the supremum of the supporting hyperplanes given by the subgradients Gu shifted to intersect
with the (µf , 0) point. See Figure 3.
Convexity of u implies that its supporting hyperplane at r with subgradient ξ(r) is below u(µf ) = 0
at µf . Thus, relative to the supporting hyperplanes of u these supporting hyperplanes of u˜ are shifted
upwards.
The extended utility function u˜ is convex-conical as it is defined by supporting hyperplanes that all
contain point (µf , 0).
• The extended state spaces are Θ ⊂ Θ˜′ ⊂ Θ˜′′ ⊂ Θ˜. State space Θ˜′ is the union of the original state space
and its point reflection about µf as Θ˜
′ = Θ ∪ {2µf − θ : θ ∈ Θ}, state space Θ˜
′′ is the convex hull of
Θ˜′, and state space Θ˜ (as previously defined) is the extended rectangular state space containing Θ˜′′.
Lemma 4.16, i.e., OPT(f, 4B, Θ˜) ≥ OPT(f,B,Θ), follows by combining the following lemmas with proofs
in the subsequent section.
Lemma 4.17. For any feasible solution u for Program (6), the extended utility function u˜ is at least u, i.e.,
u˜(r) ≥ u(r) for any report r ∈ R.
Lemma 4.18. For any feasible solution u for Program (6) with score bound B and state space Θ, the
extended utility function u˜ is a feasible solution of Program (6) with score bound 2B and state space Θ.
Lemma 4.19. Any convex-conical utility function u˜ that is a feasible solution of Program (6) with score
bound 2B and state space Θ is a feasible solution to Program (6) with bound 2B and state space Θ˜′.
Lemma 4.20. Any convex-conical utility function u˜ that is a feasible solution of Program (6) with score
bound 2B and state space Θ˜′ is a feasible solution to Program (6) with bound 2B and state space Θ˜′′ =
conv(Θ˜′).
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Lemma 4.21. Any convex-conical utility function u˜ that is a feasible solution of Program (6) with score
bound 2B and state space Θ˜′′ is a feasible solution to Program (6) with bound 4B and state space Θ˜.
4.3.3 Proofs of Lemma 4.17 to Lemma 4.21
Proof of Lemma 4.17. Since the supporting hyperplanes of u˜ are shifted upwards relative to u, we have
u˜(r) ≥ u(r) at all r ∈ R. Thus, u˜ obtains at least the objective value of u, i.e., Obj(f, u˜) ≥ Obj(f, u˜).
Proof of Lemma 4.18. First, the subgradients of u˜ are a subset of the subgradients of u that satisfy the
boundedness constraint. Lemma B.1 (stated and proved in Appendix B) shows that the set of subgradients Gu
of u that satisfy the boundedness constraint is closed. As u˜ is defined the supremum over these hyperplanes,
closure of the set implies that the supremum at any report r ∈ R is attained on one of these hyperplanes.
Now observe that in the construction of u˜, the supporting hyperplanes of u are shifted up by at most
B. The boundedness constraint corresponding to state µf and the report r with subgradient ξ(r) ∈ ∇u(r)
implies that the supporting hyperplane corresponding to ξ(r) at r has value at least −B at µf . Thus, in
the construction of the extended utility function u˜, the hyperplane corresponding to ξ(r) is shifted up by at
most B and, at any state θ ∈ Θ, u˜(θ) ≤ u(θ) +B.
Finlly, the boundedness constraint is the difference between the utility at a given state and the value of
any supporting hyperplane of the utility evaluated at that state. From u to u˜ the former has increased by
at most B and the latter is no smaller; thus, u˜ satisfies the boundedness constraint on state space Θ with
bound 2B.
Proof of Lemma 4.19. The lemma follows by the geometries of the boundedness constraint and convex cones.
The boundedness constraint requires a bounded difference between the utility at any state (in the state space)
and the value at that state on any supporting hyperplane of the utility function (corresponding to any report
in the report space). For convex-conical utility functions, the supporting hyperplanes are also supporting
hyperplanes of the cone defined by the point reflection of the utility function around its vertex (µf , 0),
henceforth, the reflected cone. Thus, the boundedness constraint for convex-conical utility function requires
that the difference between the original cone and the reflected cone be bounded at all states in the state
space.
The original space Θ and the reflected state space {2µf − θ : θ ∈ Θ} are symmetric with respect to the
original cone and the reflected cone. Thus, if states in the original state space are bounded, by comparing a
state on the cone to the same state on the reflected cone; then states in the reflected state space are bounded
by comparing its reflected state (in the original state space) on the reflected cone to its reflected state on
the original cone.
Thus, if a boundedness constraint holds on Θ it also holds on the reflected state space {2µf − θ : θ ∈ Θ}
and their union.
Proof of Lemma 4.20. Consider the cone and reflected cone defined in the proof of Lemma 4.19 and the
geometry of the boundedness constraint. Notice that, by convexity of the cone defining the utility function
u˜ and concavity of the reflected cone, the convex combination of the bounds, i.e., the difference of values
of states on these two cones, of any set of states is at least the bound of the convex combination of the
states. Hence, if the boundedness constraint holds on state space Θ˜′, then it holds on its convex hull
Θ˜′′ = conv(Θ˜′).
Proof of Lemma 4.21. Consider any ray from µf . Since the utility u˜ is a convex cone, the utility on this ray is
a linear function of the distance from µf . The same holds for this ray evaluated on the point reflection of the
utility at µf . The difference between these utilities is also linear. Thus, by the geometry of the boundedness
constraint for convex-conical utility functions, on any ray from µf , the bound is linear. Considering the state
space Θ˜′′ and Θ˜, if the former is scaled by a factor of two around µf , then it contains the latter (by simple
geometry, see Figure 2). Thus, if the convex-conical utility function u˜ satisfies bound 2B on state space Θ˜′′
it satisfies bound 4B on state space Θ˜.
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4.4 Inapproximation by Separate Scoring Rules
One way to design the scoring rule for an n-dimensional space is to average independent scoring rules
for the marginal distributions of each dimension. In this section we show that the worst-case multiplicative
approximation of scoring each dimension separately and scoring optimally is Θ(n). Moreover, the upperbound
O(n) holds for general correlated report distributions, while the lowerbound Ω(n) holds for independent
distributions.
Definition 4.22. A scoring rule S is a separate scoring rule if there exists single dimensional scoring rules
(S1, . . . , Sn) such that S(r, θ) =
∑
i Si(ri, θi).
Theorem 4.23. In n-dimensional rectangular report and state spaces, the worst-case approximation factor
of scoring each dimension separately is Θ(n).
Proof. We first argue the upper bound that scoring separately in rectangular report and state spaces guaran-
tees an O(n) approximation. By Theorem 4.12, there exists proper and bounded single-dimensional proper
scoring rules (S1, . . . , Sn) such that the induced max-over-separate S is an 8-approximation to the opti-
mal scoring rule. Let Sˆ be the separate scoring rule induced by single-dimensional proper scoring rules
( 1
n
S1, . . . ,
1
n
Sn). It is easy to verify that scoring rule Sˆ is bounded, with objective value at least
1
n
fraction
of that for scoring rule S. Thus, separate scoring rule Sˆ is an O(n) approximation to the optimal scoring
rule.
We now give an example of a symmetric distribution over posteriors over the space R = Θ = [0, 1]n
such that the approximation is Ω(n). Consider the i.i.d. distribution over posterior means f with marginal
distribution fi dimension i defined by
ri =

1 w.p. 1/2n,
1/2 w.p. 1− 1/n,
0 w.p. 1/2n.
The prior mean for each dimension is 1/2 and by Corollary 3.4, the optimal scoring rule for each dimension
i has V-shaped utility function uˆi with uˆi(0) = uˆi(1) = 1/2 and uˆi(1/2) = 0. Thus, the expected objective
value for the optimal scoring rule of dimension i is 1/2Prri∼fi [ri ∈ {0, 1}] = 1/2n. Any average of optimal
separate scoring rules, thus, has objective value 1/2n.
Now consider the max-over-separate scoring rule which has a (multi-dimensional) symmetric V-shaped
utility function u and is optimal (see Definition 4.4 and Theorem 4.6). The objective value is Er∼f [u(r)].
Importantly u(r) = 0 if r = (1/2, . . . , 1/2) and, otherwise, u(r) = 1/2. Thus,
OPT(f) = 1/2Prr∼f [r 6= (1/2, . . . , 1/2)]
= 1/2 (1− (1 − 1/n)n) ≥ 1/2 (1− 1/e).
Thus, the approximation ratio of optimal separate scoring to optimal scoring is at least e n/e− 1 (and this
bound is tight in the limit of n).
5 Eliciting the Full Distribution
In Section 2.4, we gave a reduction from the problem of optimal scoring rules for eliciting the full distribution
over a finite state space to the problem of optimal scoring rules for eliciting the marginal means over a multi-
dimensional state space. This reduction is based on representing the state space by an indicator vector. In this
section, we first observe that the optimal scoring rule can be found in polynomial time when the distribution
of posteriors is given explicitly. This result is a simple corollary of Theorem 2.14 and Theorem 4.1. Second,
we show that even for single dimensional state space with finite size, the gap in performance between the
optimal scoring rule for eliciting the mean and the optimal scoring rule for eliciting the full distribution is
unbounded.
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Corollary 5.1. Given any finite state space Θ with |Θ| = d and any distribution f with support size m over
posteriors, there exists an algorithm that computes the optimal proper bounded scoring rule for eliciting the
full distribution in time polynomial in m and d.
Proof. This result follows from combining Theorem 2.14 (the reduction from full distribution reporting to
reporting the mean) and Theorem 4.1 (polynomial time computation of the optimal scoring rule for the
mean).
We now prove that the multiplicative gap between the optimal proper scoring rule for eliciting the full
distribution and the optimal proper scoring rule for eliciting the mean is unbounded, even when the size of
the state space is a constant.
Theorem 5.2. For any ǫ ∈ (0, 12 ], there exists a state space Θ with size |Θ| = 4, and a distribution f over
the posteriors on space Θ such that the objective value of optimal scoring rule for eliciting full distribution
is at least 1/4, while the objective value of optimal scoring rule for eliciting mean is at most ǫ.
Proof. Consider the following single dimensional problem with state space Θ = {0, 1/2 − ǫ, 1/2 + ǫ, 1}. The
distribution over posteriors is
1. pointmass distributions at state 0 and 1 with probability ǫ/2 each.
2. pointmass distributions at state 1/2− ǫ and 1/2+ ǫ with probability (1 − ǫ)/2 each.
Thus, the prior mean is µf = 1/2 and by Corollary 3.4 the optimal scoring rule for reporting the mean is
V-shaped with u(0) = u(1) = 1/2 and u(1/2) = 0. Utility is linear above and below the mean with magnitude
of its slope equal to 1; thus, u(1/2± ǫ) = ǫ. The expected utility under the above distribution is
Er∼f [u(r)] =
1
2 ǫ+ ǫ (1− ǫ) ≤ ǫ,
assuming ǫ ≤ 1/2.
Consider the following mechanism for reporting the full distribution. The designer combines the low
states as L = {0, 1/2 − ǫ} and the high states as H = {1/2 + ǫ, 1} and uses a scoring rule for the indicator
variable that the state θ is high, i.e., the variable is 1 if θ ∈ H and 0 if θ ∈ L. Note that for Bernoulli
distributions, reporting the distribution is equivalent to reporting the mean of the distribution. The mean of
the posteriors of this indicator variable is µf = 1/2. For the indicator on high states, the symmetric V-shaped
utility function of Corollary 3.4 is optimal. Its performance is
Er∼f [u(1[r ∈ H ])] = 1/2.
Combining these two analyses, the approximation factor of the optimal scoring rule for the mean is at
least 2/ǫ. As ǫ approaches zero, the approximation ratio is unbounded.
6 Conclusions
In this paper, we develop a framework for optimizing scoring rules. Our objective is to maximize the incentive
for the forecaster to exert a binary level of effort subject to a boundedness constraint on the ex post score of
the scoring rule. We characterize the optimal scoring rule for eliciting the mean in single-dimensional state
spaces and in multi-dimensional state spaces with center symmetric distributions. More generally, we give a
polynomial time algorithm for computing the optimal scoring rule when the posterior distributions are given
explicitly. We also show that the simple max-over-separate scoring rule is a constant approximation to the
optimal scoring rule for eliciting the mean for any asymmetric distribution. Our novel scoring rules contrast
with standard scoring rules in theory and practice which are far from optimal in our model.
There are a number of open directions for the study of the model proposed in the paper. First, can
an (approximately) prior-independent optimal scoring rule be identified for multi-dimensional state spaces?
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Second, is the max-over-separate scoring rule a constant approximation to the optimal scoring rule for
eliciting the full distribution over a finite set of states? The difficulty of the latter question comes from the
fact that a distribution is a point in the simplex and our analysis of the approximation of max-over-separate
uses the fact that the report space is a rectangular region.
We have shown that the optimal prior-independent scoring rule, e.g., for single-dimensional states, does
not obtain a constant approximation to the optimal scoring rule. This result suggests that, for practical
implementation of good scoring rules, a theory of sample complexity for scoring rules is needed. Such a theory
would enable the principal to identify a pretty good scoring rule from samples of the posterior distributions.
There are a number potentially interesting extensions to our model that could be considered. Towards
prior-independent scoring rules, it would be interesting to consider settings with multiple forecasters. For
example, Osband (1989) considers an extension of the basic one-forecaster model where there are multiple
forecasters and only the one whose report is closest to the true state receives a reward. Could it be that
there is a Bulow and Klemperer (1996) style result where there is a prior-independent scoring rule for several
forecasters that outperforms the optimal scoring rule for fewer forecasters, e.g., one forecaster?
An important generalization of our model is to one with non-binary levels of effort. In Osband (1989)
and Neyman et al. (2020) the forecaster exerts a single-dimensional effort for learning more accurate prior.
The objective of these papers is the accuracy of the forecast as is measured by its prediction error. It would
be interesting to evaluate our max-over-separate scoring rule with richer levels of possible effort and compare
it to the optimal scoring rule. One of our main motivations for considering multi-dimensional states is the
case where these dimensions correspond to different elicitation tasks, e.g., peer graders evaluating different
submissions, peer prediction of different labeling tasks, or exam answers of different questions. For these
tasks the effort is also multi-dimensional. Optimization of scoring rules with multi-dimensional effort is a
critical problem for these applications.
Another variation to the model considers the case where the principal has to pay a cost to observe the
distinct dimensions of a realized state. For example, in the peer grading application, the multi-dimensional
state corresponds to a peer’s reviews of different submissions. It is costly to obtain ground truth labels
for the submission grades, e.g., by having an instructor grade the submission, and a natural approach is
to use spot checking. However, the most natural approach, namely spot checking one of the submissions
and assigning a grade based on an optimal scoring rule for that submission, corresponds to averaging over
separate scoring rules which we have shown is very far from optimal. Are there scoring rules that are near
optimal but are more frugal with costly evaluation of the state?
An extremal case of costly state verification is the model of peer prediction where the state cannot
be verified at all. In peer prediction there are multiple forecasters and the forecasters are scored against
each other. For example, Kong (2020) shows that there exist truthful mechanisms for eliciting the private
information from the agents for multiple symmetric tasks. It is an interesting open question to consider
optimizing for effort in peer prediction.
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A Missing Proofs in Section 2
In this section, we will formally prove Lemma 2.9 and 2.10. First we show that when the scoring rule is
bounded, the corresponding functions u(r), ξ(r), κ(θ) in the characterization of Lemma 2.8 are bounded in
the interior as well.
Lemma A.1. For any bounded scoring rule S, there exist convex function u : R→ R and function κ : Θ→ R
such that for any report r ∈ relint(R) and any state θ ∈ Θ,
S(r, θ) = u(r) + ξ(r) · (θ − r) + κ(θ)
where ξ(r) ∈ ∂u(r) is a subgradient of u, and functions u(r), ξ(r), κ(θ) are bounded for any report r ∈
relint(R) and any state θ ∈ Θ.
Proof. Since scoring rule S is bounded, let B¯θ = supr∈relint(R) S(r, θ) and Bθ = infr∈relint(R) S(r, θ). Let
rˆ ∈ relint(R) be a report in the interior such that both u(rˆ) and ξ(rˆ) are finite. Note that for any state
θ ∈ Θ, state θ locate on the boundary of the report space, i.e., θ ∈ ∂R, and the report space is a linear
combination of the state space.
For any report r ∈ relint(R), by the convexity of function u, we have
u(r) ≥ u(rˆ)− ξ(rˆ) · (r − rˆ)
and hence u(r) is bounded below.
Next we show that u(r) is bounded above for any report r ∈ relint(R). We first show that fixing any
state θ, any report r which is a linear combination of θ and rˆ has bounded utility u(r). If u(r) ≤ u(rˆ), then
naturally u(r) is bounded above. Otherwise, note that
B¯θ −Bθ ≥ S(r, θ)− S(rˆ, θ) = u(r) + ξ(r) · (θ − r) − u(rˆ)− ξ(rˆ) · (θ − rˆ)
≥ (u(r) − u(rˆ)) ·
‖θ − rˆ‖
‖rˆ − r‖
+ u(rˆ)− u(rˆ)− ξ(rˆ) · (θ − rˆ) ≥ u(r) − u(rˆ)− ξ(rˆ) · (θ − rˆ),
where the first inequality holds because the scoring rule is bounded. The second inequality holds because
the convex function u projected on line (θ, rˆ) is still a convex function. The last inequality holds because
report r lies in between θ and rˆ. Therefore, we have that u(r) is bounded above for report r lies in between
θ and rˆ. For any state θ ∈ Θ, let uˆ(θ) = limk→∞ u(r
k) where {rk}∞k=1 is a sequence of report on line (θ, rˆ)
that converges to θ. Since u(rk) are bounded for any rk, we have that uˆ(θ) is bounded as well. Since the
report space is a subset of the convex hull of the state space, we have that for any report r ∈ relint(R), u(r)
is upper bounded by the convex combination of uˆ(θ), which is also bounded by above.
For any state θ ∈ Θ, we have
S(rˆ, θ) = u(rˆ) + ξ(rˆ) · (θ − rˆ) + κ(θ),
which implies κ(θ) is bounded since all other terms are bounded.
Finally, for any report r ∈ relint(R) and any state θ ∈ Θ,
S(r, θ) = u(r) + ξ(r) · (θ − r) + κ(θ),
which implies ξ(r) · (θ − r) is bounded. Since the boundedness holds for all directions, the subgradient ξ(r)
must also be bounded.
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Lemma A.2. Given any state space Θ and report space R with non-empty interior, for any distribution
G ∈ ∆(Θ) with mean µG, there exists a sequence of posteriors {G
k} such that for any bounded function φ(θ)
in space Θ, we have {Eθ∼Gk [φ(θ)]} converges to Eθ∼G [φ(θ)].
Proof. Since space R has a non-empty interior, let G˜ be a distribution with mean µ
G˜
in the interior of R.
Let the sequence of posteriors Gk = (1 − 1/k) · G + 1/k · G˜. For any bounded function φ(θ) in space Θ, we
have
lim
k→∞
Eθ∼Gk [φ(θ)] = lim
k→∞
[(1 − 1/k) ·Eθ∼G [φ(θ)] + 1/k ·Eθ∼G˜ [φ(θ)]]→ Eθ∼G [φ(θ)] .
Lemma 2.9. Any µ-differentiable, bounded, and proper scoring rule S for eliciting the mean is equal in
expectation of truthful reports to a canonical scoring rule (defined by u, ξ, and κ), i.e., it satisfies equation (3).
Proof. By Lemma 2.8, for µ-differentiable proper scoring rule S, there exists convex function u : R→ R and
function κ : Θ→ R such that for any report r ∈ relint(R) and any state θ ∈ Θ, we have
S(r, θ) = u(r) + ξ(r) · (θ − r) + κ(θ)
where ξ(r) ∈ ∇u(r) is a subgradient of u. By Lemma A.1, since the scoring rule is bounded, function u is
convex and bounded and hence continuous in the interior. Thus, we can well define the value of u on the
boundary as its limit from the interior, i.e., set u(r) = limk→∞ u(r
k) for any r on the boundary of the report
space R and {rk}∞k=1 as a sequence of interior reports converging to r. Thus we can replace the convex
function u with continuous and convex function u for bounded scoring rules and the characterization still
holds in the interior.
For any bounded proper scoring rule, we have that u(r) is bounded for any report r ∈ relint(R) and κ(θ)
is bounded for any state θ ∈ Θ. Given any posterior G such that µG ∈ ∂R, let {G
k} be the sequence of
posteriors constructed in Lemma A.2.
1. The identity function φ(θ) = θ is bounded. Therefore, the mean of the posteriors converges, i.e.,
limk→∞ µGk = µG. And all means {µGk} are in the interior of R.
2. Function κ(θ) is bounded. Therefore, the expected value for κ converges, i.e., limk→∞ Eθ∼Gk [κ(θ)] =
Eθ∼G [κ(θ)].
3. The ex post score S(r, θ) is bounded. Therefore, the expected score for reporting µG converges, i.e.,
limk→∞ Eθ∼Gk [S(µG, θ)] = Eθ∼G [S(µG, θ)].
Moreover, considering the sequence of expected score for reporting µGk with distribution G, we have
lim
k→∞
Eθ∼G [S(µGk , θ)] = lim
k→∞
[u(µGk) +Eθ∼G [ξ(µGk) · (θ − µGk)] +Eθ∼G [κ(θ)]]
= lim
k→∞
[u(µGk) +Eθ∼Gk [κ(θ)]] = lim
k→∞
[Eθ∼Gk [S(µGk , θ)]
where the second equality holds because limk→∞ Eθ∼Gk [κ(θ)] = Eθ∼G [κ(θ)] and limk→∞ µGk = µG. Com-
bining the equalities, we have
Eθ∼G [S(µG, θ)] = lim
k→∞
Eθ∼Gk [S(µG, θ)] ≤ lim
k→∞
Eθ∼Gk [S(µGk , θ)]
= lim
k→∞
Eθ∼Gk [S(µGk , θ)] = lim
k→∞
Eθ∼G [S(µGk , θ)] ≤ Eθ∼G [S(µG, θ)]
where the inequalities holds by the properness of the scoring rule. Therefore, all inequalities must be
equalities, and hence
Eθ∼G [S(µG, θ)] = lim
k→∞
Eθ∼Gk [S(µGk , θ)] = lim
k→∞
Eθ∼Gk [u(µGk) + κ(θ)] = u(µG) +Eθ∼G [κ(θ)] .
where the last equality hold since function u is continuous.
Finally, given any bounded, continuous and convex function u with bounded subgradients and any
bounded function κ, the corresponding canonical scoring rule is proper, bounded, and the expected score
coincides.
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Lemma 2.10. For any µ-differentiable and proper scoring rule S inducing utility function u (via Lemma 2.9)
and satisfying score bounded in [0, B], there is a canonical scoring rule defined by u (and some ξ and κ) that
satisfies the same score bound, i.e., it satisfies equation (4).
Proof. If a proper scoring rule S is induced by function u and bounded by B in space Θ, by Lemma 2.8,
there exists function κ : Θ→ R such that for any report r ∈ relint(R) and any state θ ∈ Θ,
S(r, θ) = u(r) + ξ(r) · (θ − r) + κ(θ)
where ξ(r) ∈ ∇u(r) is a subgradient of u. Moreover, the score S(r, θ) ∈ [0, B] for any report and state
r ∈ R, θ ∈ Θ. Thus, it holds that for any report and state r ∈ relint(R), θ ∈ Θ
S(θ, θ)− S(r, θ) = u(θ)− u(r) − ξ(r)(θ − r) ≤ B.
For any report R ∈ ∂R, there exists a sequence of reports ri such that {rk} converges to r and ξ(r) =
limk→∞ ξ(rk) is a subgradient at report r. Thus, it holds that for any report r ∈ ∂R and state θ ∈ Θ,
S(θ, θ)− S(r, θ) = u(θ)− u(r)− lim
k→∞
ξ(rk)(θ − r) ≤ B.
Therefore, the canonical scoring rule defined by u with the same function κ is proper and bounded in
[0, B].
B Missing Proofs in Section 4
Lemma B.1. For any feasible solution u for Program (6), the set Gu of all subgradients of u satisfying the
bounded constraints is a closed set.
Proof. By Lemma 2.9, any feasible solution u for Program (6) is convex, bounded and continuous with
bounded subgradients. For any convex, bounded and continuous function u, let {ξk(rk)}∞k=1 ⊆ Gu be a
convergent sequence of subgradients in set Gu, where r
k is the report corresponds to the kth subgradient.
Let ξ∗ = limk→∞ ξ
k(rk) be the limit of the subgradients. Since the report space is a closed and bounded
space, there exists a subsequence of reports {rkj}∞j=1 ⊆ {rk}
∞
k=1 such that {r
kj}∞j=1 converges. Letting report
r = limj→∞ r
kj , we have report r is in the report space, i.e., r ∈ R. Moreover, we have limj→∞ ξ
kj (rkj ) =
limk→∞ ξ
k(rk) = ξ∗. Next we show that ξ∗ is a subgradient for some report r ∈ R such that the bounded
constraints of the induced scoring rule are satisfied for any state θ ∈ Θ, i.e., ξ∗ ∈ Gu,r.
First for any state θ, we have
u(r) + ξ∗ · (θ − r) = lim
j→∞
[u(rkj ) + ξ∗ · (θ − rkj )]
= lim
j→∞
[u(rkj ) + ξkj (rkj ) · (θ − rkj )] ≤ u(θ),
where the first equality holds because function u and function ξ∗ · r are continuous and bounded in reports.
The inequality holds because ξkj (rkj ) is a subgradient for report rkj . Thus ξ∗ is subgradient for report r.
Next we show that the scoring rule induced by subgradient ξ∗ is bounded for report r. For any state θ, we
have
u(θ)− u(r)− ξ∗ · (θ − r) = u(θ)− lim
j→∞
[u(rkj ) + ξkj (rkj ) · (θ − rkj )] ≤ u(θ)− (u(θ)−B) = B,
where the inequality holds because the subgradient ξkj (rkj ) satisfies the bounded constraint for report rkj
at state θ, i.e., ξkj (rkj ) ∈ G
u,r
kj and u(r
kj ) + ξkj (rkj ) · (θ − rkj ) ≥ u(θ) − B. Therefore, ξ∗ ∈ Gu,r ⊂ Gu,
which implies the set Gu is a closed set.
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